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The Muncie Gear Doctrine and the Effect of
Section 132 Upon It
ROBERT C. RYAN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision
in Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co.' Since
that decision was handed down, all but one" of the federal appeals
courts that have dealt with the issues have correctly interpreted
the so-called "late claiming" doctrine" announced in Muncie Gear.
This interpretation invalidates patent claims presented by amend-
ment more than the statutory period after public sale or use only
O 1980 by Robert C. Ryan
* B.A., B.S. in I.E., University of Illinois, 1976; J.D., Northwestern University, June 1979;
Practitioner before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; Member Illinois Bar; Associated
with Allegretti, Newitt, Witcoff & McAndrews, Chicago, Illinois.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to those attorneys who have provided inval-
uable advice and assistance in preparing this article, especially Timothy L. Tilton, lecturer
at the Northwestern University School of Law, to whom this article was originally submitted
in fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Research and Writing Program at the Law
School.
1. 315 U.S. 759 (1942).
2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not correctly dealt
with the issue. See notes 152-77 and accompanying text infra. Although it can reasonably be
argued that the Court of Claims also mishandled the issue in Pratt and Whitney Co. v.
United States, 345 F.2d 838, 843-45 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (alternative holding), that panel's discus-
sion on this point is far less than clear. Given several later decisions by the Court of Claims
in Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1979), and Rel-Reeves, Inc. v.
United States, 534 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1976), the Pratt and Whitney decision should be
viewed as having been poorly written rather than incorrectly decided. See notes 103-14 and
accompanying text infra. In any event, through Bendix and Rel-Reeves, the Court of Claims
has corrected any mistaken interpretation of Muncie Gear that may have existed as a result
of its Pratt and Whitney decision. Id.
3. The United States Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the Court of Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals have dealt with the issue. See notes 6 and 7 infra.
4. E.g., 3 D. CHISUM, PATENTS §11.05 (1979) [hereinafter cited as D. CHisuM]; Flocks &
Neimark, Is There a Viable Doctrine of Non-Statutory Late Claiming as a Defense in Pat-
ent Litigation?, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 676 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Flocks & Neimark];
Gardner, Late Claiming, 9 IDEA 321 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Gardner].
5. The word amendment as used herein refers not only to amendments as that term is
used literally in the proceedings before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but also to
continuation applications, which are amendments in essence but not form. See note 77
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if the claims were not supported by the disclosure of the original
application." Only the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit has taken the decision a step further toward what is
truly a non-statutory "late claiming" doctrine and invalidated pat-
ent claims that, though supported by the original disclosure, were
not directed to matter essentially the same as that claimed in the
original application.7 When compared with the language and rea-
soning of Muncie Gear itself'8 and with the scheme embodied in
the reissue statutes,9 the Second Circuit's interpretation of Muncie
intra.
6. Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 679-84 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Cardinal of Adrian, Inc. v. Peerless Wood Prods., Inc., 515 F.2d
534, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1975); Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 393-94
(10th Cir. 1974); Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 415-16 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 479 F.2d 1328
(5th Cir.) (per curiam adopting district court opinion), aff'g 359 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Ajem Labs., Inc. v. C.M. Ladd Co., 424 F.2d 1124,
1128-29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830, (1970); Int'l Paper Box Mach. Co. v. Specialty
Automatic Mach. Corp., 414 F.2d 1254, 1258-59, 1261-62 (1st Cir. 1969); Gen. Instrument
Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 399 F.2d 373, 377-80 (1st Cir. 1968); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v.
Continental Can Co., 397 F.2d 517, 522 (7th Cir. 1968); Wen Prods., Inc. v. Portable Electric
Tools, Inc., 367 F.2d 764, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1966); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Refrigerated
Dispensers, Inc., 354 F.2d 533, 538-39 (10th Cir. 1965); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Hecke-
thorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 322 F.2d 406, 417 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 308 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952
(1963); Pursche v. Atlas Scraper and Eng'r Co., 300 F.2d 467, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 959 (1963); Locklin v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 299 F.2d 160, 167 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962); Sparton Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 706-07
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962); Chicopee Mfg. Co. v. Kendall Co., 288
F.2d 719, 722-25 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961); Aetna Steel Prods. Corp. v.
Southwest Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 323, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 945
(1961); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1960),
appeal dismissed, 366 U.S. 211 (1961); Nat'l Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 274 F.2d
224, 229-31 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960); Coats Loaders & Stackers, Inc.
v. Henderson, 233 F.2d 915, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1956); Tubular Serv. & Eng'r Co. v. Sun Oil
Co., 220 F.2d 27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 170 F.2d 6, 9-10 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956); Ben-
dix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Rel-Reeves, Inc. v. United
States, 534 F.2d 274, 280-81 (Ct. Cl. 1976); In re Ruscetta, 255 F.2d 687, 690-91 (C.C.P.A.
1958).
7. Kahn v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 508 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir.) (alternative holding),
aff'g 367 F. Supp. 63, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930
(1975). See also Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, 229 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam adopting
district court decision), afl'g, 120 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Harries v. Air King Prods.
Co., 183 F.2d 148, 160 (2d Cir. 1950); Interchemical Corp. v. Sinclair and Carroll Co., 144
F.2d 842, 846 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 325 U.S. 327 (1945). But see R.U.V.
Eng'r Corp. v. Borden Co., 170 F.2d 688, 689 (2d Cir. 1948); Eng'r Dev. Labs. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 153 F.2d 523, 526 (2d Cir. 1946).
8. 315 U.S. 759, 759-68.
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252.
Muncie Gear and Section 132
Gear is unreasonable and analytically unsound. With respect to
the disclosure requirement, non-Second Circuit federal appeals
courts have therefore been correct in their dealings with the deci-
sion in Muncie Gear.
Nevertheless, the continued analysis of amendments under the
test announced in Muncie Gear is improper. Though the parame-
ters established by Muncie Gear may have been justifiably fol-
lowed in the decade immediately following the Muncie Gear deci-
sion, the enactment of 35 U.S.C. section 132 in 1952 flatly rejected
an essential element of the Muncie Gear analysis with respect to
the validity of an amendment to a patent application. 0 Under sec-
tion 132, the only relevant issue is whether an amendment presents
claims not supported by the disclosure of the original application."
Though none of the non-Second Circuit federal appeals courts
have spoken directly to this issue, they have taken widely dispa-
rate and often confusing approaches in dealing with section 132
and the supposed "late claiming" doctrine of Muncie Gear. One of
the circuit courts has relied exclusively on section 132 without
mention of the Muncie Gear test.'2 Four of the circuits" have re-
lied on or referred to section 132 erratically and confusingly at
best. Incredibly, three circuit courts 4 and the Court of Claims's
continue to rely solely on the Muncie Gear test, making no men-
tion of section 132 at all. And, of course, the Second Circuit's has
promulgated an interpretation of Muncie Gear on which section
132 has no effect when the claims in issue, though not claiming
new matter, are directed to matter not essentially identical to that
originally claimed by the patentee. Thus, despite the twenty-six-
year-old statutory mandate of section 132, the federal appeals
courts have yet to realize the full effect of section 132 and the in-
applicability of the supposed "late claiming" doctrine of Muncie
Gear when determining the validity of an amendment that
presents claims not supported by the disclosure of the original ap-
10. See text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1952) provides in pertinent part: "No amendment shall introduce
new matter into the disclosure of the invention." See text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
12. The Third Circuit has so relied. See text accompanying notes 144-47 infra.
13. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have followed this approach. See
text accompanying notes 110-43 infra.
14. The First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits ignore § 132. See text accompanying notes 85-
102 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 103-09 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 152-77 infra.
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plication. They also disagree with the very interpretation of the
Muncie Gear decision itself.
This article will first examine the impropriety of the interpreta-
tion of Muncie Gear that yields the non-statutory "late claiming"
doctrine. In this context, the rationale and holding of Muncie Gear
as well as the logic of the statutory scheme embodied in the reissue
statutes 17 will be discussed. Then, the article will examine the ef-
fect of section 132 upon the analysis of an amendment to a patent
application. Finally, the conflicting federal appeals court decisions
under both Muncie Gear and section 132 will be analyzed in terms
of their interpretations of Muncie Gear and the recognition given
to section 132.
THE HOLDING OF MUNCIE GEAR
The Muncie Gear Decision
In Muncie Gear, the respondents, the patentee and its exclusive
licensee,"8 brought a patent infringement action against the peti-
tioners, a manufacturer and a sales companyi'8 The patent in issue
was directed to an invention in a water propulsion device which
the petitioners' outboard motors had allegedly infringed.20 Though
the defense had not been expressly dealt with in the District 21 or
Appeals Courts,2 ' prior public use or sale of a device embodied in
the patentee's claims became the dispositive issue on certiorari to
the Supreme Court.' 8
The patentee's original application in Muncie Gear was filed on
August 25, 1926, and had urged an anti-torque, plate as the inven-
tion.24 This plate extended behind the propeller of the outboard
motor to compensate for the constant turning force on the boat
generated by the rotating propeller. The patentee did not file the
17. See note 9 supra.
18. Respondent Johnson Brothers Engineering Corp. was the owner of the patent. Re-
spondent Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Co. was the exclusive licensee under the
patent.
19. Petitioner Muncie Gear Works, Inc., manufactured the outboard motors which were
alleged to infringe U.S. Patent No. 1,716,962, owned by Johnson Brothers Engineering Corp.
Petitioner Bruns & Collins, Inc., sold the outboard motors made by Muncie Gear Works,
Inc.
20. 315 U.S. 759, 759-60.
21. Id. at 765; the district court opinion was not reported.
22. Id. at 765; Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Muncie Gear Works, Inc., 119 F.2d 404
(7th Cir. 1941), rev'd 315 U.S. 759 (1942).
23. 315 U.S. 759, 759, 765-66, 768. Certiorari was granted in 314 U.S. 594 (1941).
24. Id. at 761-62.
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final amendment to the original patent application until March 30,
1929. That amendment contained four claims directed to an anti-
cavitation plate as the invention, rather than the originally empha-
sized anti-torque plate. 8 The anti-cavitation plate, horizontally
mounted on the housing above the propeller, increased the propul-
sive effect of the propeller by preventing air from being drawn into
the propeller from above the water's surface. Two of the amended
claims also mentioned for the first time an unbroken exterior sur-
face on the housing of the device. 2' These four claims became the
claims in issue.'7
The respondents had admitted at trial that the respondent-li-
censee's predecessor had marketed outboard motors with all of the
features of the claims in suit in January or February of 1926.28 Ad-
ditionally, one of the respondents' competitors had manufactured
and sold a similar device one year later.2'9 Thus, both public uses
had occurred more than two years prior to the amendment of
March 30, 1929.
Relying upon section 4886 of the Revised Statutes,30 the Court
stated the applicable rule of law; "The claims in question are inva-
lid if there was public use or sale, of the device which they are
claimed to cover, more than two years before the first disclosure
thereof to the Patent Office." ' The Court emphasized that the
25. Id. at 762. The Court had noted earlier in the opinion that the original specifications
and drawing, filed on August 25, 1926, had "both indicated an anti-cavitation plate which
the specifications said 'prevents cavitation,' but it was in no way asserted that the cavitation
plate was new, or that it was being employed in any novel cooperative relation to the other
elements." Id. at 761-62. The Court further noted that other interim amendments, prior to
the final amendment in issue on certiorari, "did not even suggest the presently asserted
invention." Id. at 762. When the amendment in issue was finally filed on March 30, 1929,
the patentee had made changes, the effect of which, said the Court, "was aptly described by
the patent examiner: 'The amendments have been such that the claims now emphasize the
anti-cavitation plate rather than the anti-torque plate.' With changes which are immaterial
here, the new claims so offered became the claims in issue." Id.
26. Id. at 762-63.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 764.
29. Id.
30. R.S. 4886, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §
102(b)(1972)).
31. 315 U.S. 759, 768. The period is now one year under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1972). Sec-
tion 102(b) now provides: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, more than
one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States." (Emphasis ad-
ded.) The former "Patent Office" as referred to in Muncie Gear is now entitled the "Patent
and Trademark Office." 1975 amendments to Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat.
1949 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1952)).
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original application and all pre-March 30, 1929, amendments had
"wholly failed to disclose the invention now asserted. 32 Thus, the
Court stated, "We think the conclusion is inescapable that there
was public use, or sale, of devices embodying the asserted inven-
tion, more than two years before it was first presented to the Pat-
ent Office." 33 All claims were held invalid.s
The Correct Interpretation of Muncie Gear
Despite the express language and reasoning of Muncie Gear, at
least one author" and a multiplicity of defendants' attorneys have
attempted to stretch Muncie Gear well beyond its express holding
to encompass a non-statutory "late claiming" doctrine.3 6 According
to this alleged doctrine, "claims directed to an invention disclosed
but not claimed in the [original] application may not be added to
the amendment more than the statutory period after public use."
3 7
There is no sound basis for such a doctrine.
In Muncie Gear, the Court explicitly found no disclosure of the
later claimed invention in the original application. 8 Moreover, the
rule of law announced by the Court as the rationale for its decision
focused solely on public use or sale two years prior to the "first
disclosure" of the invention to the Patent Office.39 Further, the
Court's holding invalidated the claims because of public use or sale
two years before the invention in issue "was first presented to the
Patent Office." 0 The court's language, reasoning, and holding
therefore allow for no interpretation that would authorize the sup-
posed non-statutory "late claiming" doctrine. More correctly
stated, the Court had, at most, created a "late disclosure" doctrine
wherein claims submitted via amendment two years after public
sale or use would be invalid only when unsupported by the original
disclosure.
Some have argued' 1 that a close examination of the facts of
32. 315 U.S. 759, 768.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Gardner, supra note 2.
36. See cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra for a small sampling of the cases in which the
federal courts have had to deal with such attempts by defendants. See also, Flocks and
Neimark, supra note 4, at 677, 700-03.
37. Gardner, supra note 4, at 321, 327.
38. 315 U.S. 759, 768. See the text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Gardner, supra note 4, at 324-27.
[Vol. 11
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Muncie Gear reveals that two of the claims in issue were directed
to an invention that had been disclosed in the original application.
Thus, they assert that those two claims were held invalid since
they were added to the application in violation of their non-statu-
tory late claiming doctrine."'
Assuming, arguendo, that the invention at issue in Muncie Gear
was in fact disclosed in the original application, such a circum-
stance does not justify promulgation of a non-statutory late claim-
ing doctrine. Clearly, the Supreme Court believed that the original
application in Muncie Gear "wholly failed to disclose the invention
[then] asserted" by the patentee. 4 Furthermore, there is no refer-
ence in the Muncie Gear opinion to any rule of law that would
support the Court's invalidation of claims when the invention
claimed by amendment was disclosed in the original application.
42. Id.
43. 315 U.S. 759, 768.
44. The Court in Muncie Gear placed reliance on only two cases in deriving its holding.
315 U.S. at 768. Both cases, Schriber-Shroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 53-61
(1938) and Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1878), essentially held
that an application could not be amended to embrace an invention not originally disclosed
when adverse rights of the public have intervened. Hence, neither case can be cited as sup-
port for the invalidation of claims offered by amendment which are supported by the origi-
nal disclosure.
Of particular importance in this regard are several cases that the Supreme Court would
surely have cited in Muncie Gear had it intended to create a non-statutory late claiming
defense. The two cases, General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S.
175, 183 (1938), and Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167
(1938), had held that, at least in the absence of "intervening adverse rights," an applicant
need show no excuse for claiming originally disclosed but unclaimed subject matter two
years after his own public sale or use. In both Crown Cork & Seal, 304 U.S. at 167-68, and
General Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 183, the language referring to "intervening adverse
rights" was merely an attempt by the Court to limit its decisions to the issues immediately
before it-issues not involving any sort of prior adverse rights. Nevertheless, the absence of
citation to either case in Muncie Gear is important for two reasons.
First, a late claiming doctrine would have been an extension of the language in both cases
concerning the claiming of originally disclosed but unclaimed subject matter more than two
years after public sale or use by someone other than the patentee or assignee. Surely the
Court would have made note of this fact had it intended to announce a rule of law which
would require the invalidation of claims directed to an invention originally disclosed but not
claimed if submitted more than two years after public sale or use by anyone.
Secondly, had the Court in Muncie Gear intended to create such a late claiming doctrine,
it would, of course, have then been reversing the very holdings of both Crown Cork & Seal
and General Talking Pictures. Such a lack of citation by the Court in Muncie Gear to two
decisions that it would have been reversing would be even more difficult to comprehend.
The absence of reference to either case thus makes a late claiming doctrine all the more
suspect and doubtful.
See D. CHIsUM, supra note 4, for a more complete discussion of the case history prior to
Muncie Gear.
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Thus, the facts notwithstanding, the Court did not intend to create
a non-statutory late claiming doctrine. Supreme Court authority
for the alleged doctrine is non-existent.
Hypothetical argument aside, the facts of Muncie Gear do not,
in and of themselves, support any non-statutory late claiming doc-
trine. An analysis of the Muncie Gear facts in light of the law of
disclosure compels the conclusion that all four claims in issue were
directed to an invention that was not "disclosed" in the original
application.
Fifty-two years before the Muncie Gear decision, the Supreme
Court announced its definition of "new matter" in Topliff v. Top-
liff. 45 "New matter" is a term of art in patent law referring to that
which is added to a patent application and directed to an inven-
tion beyond the original disclosure.46 The Topliff Court explained
that a patentee has claimed new matter when he amends his appli-
cation to "change the invention" or introduce "what might be the
subject matter of another application for patent.' 7
In Muncie Gear, the Court recognized that, "The [original] spec-
ifications and drawings indicated an anti-cavitation plate which
the specifications said 'prevents cavitation,' but it was in no way
asserted that the cavitation plate was new, or that it was being
employed in any novel cooperative relation to the other ele-
ments."'48 It was not until two years after public use or sale of a
device embodied in the claims in issue that the patentee in Muncie
Gear claimed the anti-cavitation plate as his invention .' The pat-
entee had therefore changed his invention, as the claims submitted
via amendment were then directed to the anti-cavitation plate
rather than the originally emphasized anti-torque plate.50 Thus,
the patentee in Muncie Gear went beyond the original disclosure
to include new matter in each of the claims in issue.
45. 145 U.S. 156 (1892).
46. Giant Powder Co. v. California Powder Works, 98 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1891). Cf.,
Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat'l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281 (1940); Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S.
156 (1892) (Both cases use the term "new matter" to mean that which is added to a patent
application beyond the original disclosure.).
47. 145 U.S. 156, 166. The Court's explanation of the term "new matter" in Topliff is a
direct quote from Powder Co. v. Powder Works, 98 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1891).
48. 315 U.S. 759, 761-62.
49. Id. at 762.
50. Id.
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Conflict with the Reissue Statutes
There is yet another difficulty with the argument that Muncie
Gear created a non-statutory late claiming doctrine. Any such doc-
trine would directly conflict with the scheme presented in the reis-
sue statutes.0 1 It is true that the statutes were not enacted until
ten years after Muncie Gear was handed down. Given, however,
the tortuous interpretation which Muncie Gear must be put
through to derive the highly suspect late claiming doctrine, the
contradictory situation which that interpretation creates when
compared to the results reached by the reissue statutes is simply
unreasonable and unjustified.
35 U.S.C. section 251 provides that, when an originally granted
patent is found to be partly inoperative or invalid due to error
without any deceptive intent on the part of the patentee, the pat-
entee or assignee may refile the application under the provision of
35 U.S.C. section 120 and obtain the benefit of the earlier filing
date. It is further provided that "No reissue patent shall be
granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent un-
less applied for within two years of the grant from the original pat-
ent.""2 35 U.S.C. section 120 provides that a correctly filed s reis-
sue application "shall have the same effect, as to such application,
as though filed on the date of the prior application. . . ." The
scheme is completed by reference to 35 U.S.C. section 252 which
states:
No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of any per-
son or his successors in business who made, purchased or used
prior to the grant of a reissue anything patented by the reissued
patent, to continue the use of, or to sell to others to be used or
sold, the specific thing so made, purchased or used, unless the
making, using or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of
the reissued patent which was in the original patent.
The result of this statutory scheme for reissues in the 1952 Act
is that the patentee is entitled by statutory right to decide to seek
a reissue patent with claims broadened to include the originally
disclosed invention any time during the pendency of his original
51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
53. A reissue application is correctly filed when it meets the requirement of 35 U.S.C. §
112. Section 112 explains the manner in which the specifications and claims must be
written.
1980]
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application. 4 The patentee is also entitled to a broadened reissue
patent within two years after the grant of the original patent.85
The reissue patent retains full force and effect against all infring-
ers except those who have acquired intervening rights, i.e., those
who had begun making, selling, or using a device, not embraced in
the original patent, which the reissued patent was subsequently
broadened to include.5
Therefore, if a non-statutory late claiming doctrine had been
promulgated in Muncie Gear, a patentee could not broaden his
original claims by amendment if there has been public use two
years before the date of amendment. 7 On the other hand, under
the reissue statutes, the same patentee can broaden his claims,
notwithstanding public use or sale, to embrace the same invention
originally disclosed if he files a reissue application, instead of an
amendment, within two years after the original grant. Moreover,
should the patentee violate the non-statutory late claiming doc-
trine, all claims in violation will be held invalid. Correctly filed
reissue claims, on the other hand, will remain valid even, though
broadened. They simply become unenforceable against those who
have acquired intervening rights. The supposed late claiming doc-
trine and reissue statutes have thus taken contradictory stances
with the result hinging upon the form of broadening employed:
amendment or reissue. No valid reason exists for such distinction.
Because the reissue scheme is statutory in origin, it cannot be
interfered with by the courts even though they may feel that the
scheme is inimical to the public interest or contrary to the sup-
posed late claiming doctrine. 9 Therefore, the contradictory and
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 251.
55. Id.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 252.
57. Gardner, supra note 4, at 321, 327.
58. Id. See also Kahn v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 508 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir.) (alternative
holding), afl'g 367 F. Supp. 63, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (alternative holding).
59. The Supreme Court made this proposition clear in United States v. American Bell
Tele., 167 U.S. 224 (1897), where the government sought to invalidate a patent because of
the patentee's delay in filing his original application until almost two years after the date of
his invention. The Court answered:
Under § 4886, Rev. Stat., an inventor has two years from the time his invention is
disclosed to the public within which to make his application, and unless an aban-
donment is shown during that period he is entitled to a patent .... The statute
has given this right, and no consideration of public benefit can take it from him.
His right exists because Congress declares that it should. . . . A party seeking a
right under the patent statutes may avail himself of all their provisions, and the
courts may not deny him the benefit of a single one. These are questions not of
[Vol. 11
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unreasonable result reached under a non-statutory late claiming
doctrine must yield to the policy embodied in the reissue statute
which allows the broadening of claims when supported by the pat-
entee's original disclosure.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of the literal in-
terpretation of Muncie Gear espoused herein is the overwhelming
legal precedent in favor of that interpretation. Of thirty-one opin-
ions60 handed down by the federal appeals courts that have ad-
dressed the issue, 1 only ones' opinion clearly varied from the "late
disclosure" interpretation which Muncie Gear demands. The vast
majority of federal appeals courts have uniformly and correctly fol-
lowed the plain wording of Muncie Gear to invalidate claims of-
fered in an amendment "if there was public use or sale, of the de-
vice which they are claimed to cover, more than two years before
the first disclosure thereof to the Patent Office.""
THE EFFECT OF THE 1952 PATENT ACT ON MUNCIE GEAR
Ten years after Muncie Gear was decided, Congress enacted the
1952 Patent Act," which is still in force today. It has been asserted
that this Act did no more in large part than codify existing judicial
precedents.6 5 However, an analysis of the Act as it affects the hold-
ing of Muncie Gear reveals that the Patent Act did not codify that
case. It altered Muncie Gear's rule of law abruptly.
As explained above," the Court in Muncie Gear held that claims
natural but of purely statutory right.
* . . No court can disregard any statutory provisions in respect to these matters
on the ground that in its judgment they are unwise or prejudicial to the inter-
ests of the public.
167 U.S. 224, 246-47 (emphasis added).
Later, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), the Court further explained
that Congress can structure the patent laws at its whim under the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8, as long as the statutory scheme remains "[w]ithin the constitutional grant." Since it has
not and cannot be contended that the reissue statutes are unconstitutional for being outside
of Congress' article I powers, the courts must enforce them as statutory rights.
60. See cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra.
61. The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the
Court of Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals have addressed the issue.
See notes 6 and 7 supra.
62. Kahn v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., note 7 supra. See text accompanying notes 66-73
infra.
63. Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., 315 U.S. 759, 768 (1942).
64. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1952).
65. E.g., Aetna Steel Prod. Corp. v. Southwest Prod. Co., 282 F.2d 323, 333 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 845 (1961).
66. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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added by amendment were invalid if there was public use or sale of
a device embodied in the claims more than the statutory period
before the first disclosure of the invention to the Patent Office. 67 In
Cardinal of Adrian, Inc. v. Peerless Wood Products, Inc.," the
Sixth Circuit recognized that this rule results in a "two-pronged"
test in which claims are held invalid if:
[1] the amendments made to each patent application broadened
the patent so that it covered additional inventions, i.e., contained
new matter [, and]
[2] the amendments constituted the first disclosure of the devices
which had been [in public use or] on sale for more than a
year .... 69
In 1952, however, 35 U.S.C. section 132 was enacted into law. Sec-
tion 132 provides, "No amendment shall introduce new matter into
the disclosure of the invention."' 70 The section makes no reference
to the second prong of the two-pronged test announced in Muncie
Gear; the "public use or sale" element of the analysis of amend-
ments was eliminated. Under the plain language of section 132, a
claim embodying new matter that is added by amendment is inva-
lid without reference to any public use or sale of the invention
embodied in the claim.
The result achieved by section 132 cannot be disregarded or
changed by judicial authority alone .7 Because Congress acted pur-
suant to its Article 172 powers in enacting section 132, the statutory
rights and limitation inherent in that section must be enforced.7
Thus, with respect to amendments, Muncie Gear was overruled
legislatively by section 132.
There is, however, a situation in which the two-pronged analysis
of Muncie Gear should continue to have vitality. This is the case
where new matter is added, not by amendment, but by a "continu-
ation-in-part application."
Under 35 U.S.C. section 120, an application for patent of an in-
vention disclosed in a prior application by the same inventor can
be filed while the application is pending. This later-filed applica-
67. At the time Muncie Gear was decided the statutory period was two years. The corre-
sponding statutory period today is one year. See note 31 supra.
68. 515 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1975).
69. Id. at 538 (emphasis in original).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 132.
71. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
72. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
73. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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tion is commonly referred to as a continuing application.7 ' For the
portion of the invention claimed in the continuing application that
was originally disclosed, the application "shall have the same effect
• . . as though filed on the date of the prior application. 7 5 Section
120 makes no provision, however, for those portions of the continu-
ing application that consist of new matter, and section 132 only
places a ban on new matter that is offered via amendment.
Technically, as the term is used in the rules governing the exam-
ination of patent applications by the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, 7 6 a refiled application that contains new matter is referred to
as a "continuation-in-part application. 717 Therefore, when a con-
tinuation-in-part application is filed, section 132 is inapplicable
and the Muncie Gear two-pronged analysis remains appropriate.
The use of the two-pronged Muncie Gear test to determine the
validity of a continuation-in-part application is not novel. For ex-
ample, in Cardinal of Adrian, Inc: v. Peerless Wood Products,
Inc.,s the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a situation where the
patentee had filed a continuing application that the court found to
contain new matter.79 Thus, the patentee had, in effect, filed a con-
tinuation-in-part application though the court made no mention of
the label that the patentee had used. The court correctly turned to
the two-pronged test of Muncie Gear and held that, since the
claiming of new matter via the continuing application had oc-
curred more than one year after public use of a device embodied in
the claims, the claims were invalid.80
FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS UNDER
MUNCIE GEAR OR SECTION 132
Despite section 132's total ban on the presentation of new mat-
ter in an amendment, at least seven of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal8 and the Court of Claims82 continue to employ
74. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.06(a) at 9 (rev. 3d ed. Jan. 1978).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 120.
76. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.08 at 10.2 (rev. 3d ed. Jan. 1978).
77. Those continuing applications which do not add new matter are called either contin-
uation or divisional applications. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 201.06,
201.07 at 8-9, 10.2 (rev. 3d ed. Jan. 1978). The distinction between continuation and divi-
sional applications is not relevant for purposes of this article, however.
78. 515 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1975).
79. Id. at 539.
80. Id. Accord, In re Ruscetta, 255 F.2d 687, 690-91 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
81. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits continue to em-
ploy the full Muncie Gear test. See text accompanying notes 85-102, 110-43 infra.
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the full, late disclosure type of two-pronged test from Muncie Gear
when a patented is alleged to have violated the supposed late
claiming doctrine. Indeed, three of the same seven circuits83 have
never even acknowledged the existence of section 132 or its ban on
new matter. Only in the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals84 can it be argued, though very tenuously, that section 132
has been or will be recognized for what it is-a partial rejection of
Muncie Gear's two-pronged test. Amazingly, however, no federal
appeals court decision was found that either expressly or impliedly
addressed the conflict between section 132 and the Muncie Gear
test.
Failure to Address Section 132
The First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits and the Court of Claims
have completely failed to acknowledge the existence of section 132.
They have, however, adopted the late disclosure interpretation of
Muncie Gear when the validity of an amendment is put in issue by
the late claiming defense.
1. The First Circuit
In two cases, one decided in 196885 and the other in 1969,86 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit plainly adopted the late dis-
closure interpretation of Muncie Gear when the validity of an
amendment was put in issue by the late claiming defense. In the
first of the two, General Instrument Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft
Co.,87 the court upheld the defense, stating:
[C]laim 60 . . . must be considered new matter. [Citation omit-
ted.] And since commercial sales of [a device], which embodied all
the 'new matter' embraced in claim 60, had commenced over a
year prior to the filing thereof the claim fails for 'late claiming.'
35 U.S.C. §102 (b); Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard Marine
& Mfg. Co..
A year later, in International Paper Box Machine Co. v. Specialty
Automatic Machine Corp.," the First Circuit again made approv-
82. See text accompanying notes 103-09 infra.
83. See text accompanying notes 85-102 infra.
84. See text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
85. Gen. Instr. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 399 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1968).
86. Int'l Paper Box Mach. Corp. v. Specialty Automatic Mach. Corp., 414 F.2d 1254 (1st
Cir. 1969).
87. 399 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1968).
88. 414 F.2d 1254, 1261 (1st Cir. 1969).
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ing reference to "the Muncie Gear Doctrine." Finding that the
claim at issue in International Paper had been disclosed in the
patentee's original application, the court never reached the "prior
public use or sale" prong of the Muncie Gear test.8 9
Neither General Instrument nor International Paper made even
passing reference to the section 132 ban on the addition of new
matter via amendment. Thus, the First Circuit continues to rely on
the two-pronged test of Muncie Gear without any recognition that
the secoid prong, the "public use or sale" prong, is no longer rele-
vant in. the analysis of an amendment.
2. The Sixth Circuit
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Muncie
Gear, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
consistently and repeatedly applied the late disclosure version of
the two-pronged Muncie Gear test when the validity of an amend-
ment has come into question.90 In the five decisions rendered by
the Sixth Circuit in which the amendments in issue were subject to
the provisions of the 1952 Patent Act,91 not one has made even
footnote reference to the existence of section 132 or its flat ban on
new matter.
Cardinal of Adrian, Inc. v. Peerless Wood Products, Inc.,92 a
89. Id. at 1261-62.
90. Cardinal of Adrian, Inc. v. Peerless Wood Prods., Inc., 515 F.2d 532, 538-39 (6th Cir.
1975); Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 415-16 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 917 (1974); Ajem Labs., Inc. v. C.M. Ladd Co., 424 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethron Mfg. & Supply
Co., 332 F.2d 406, 417 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888, (1964); Sparton Corp. v. Evans
Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 706-07 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962); Nat'l
Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 274 F.2d 224, 229-31 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 989 (1960); Coats Loaders & Stackers, Inc. v. Henderson, 233 F.2d 915, 922-23 (6th Cir.
1956); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 170 F.2d 6, 9-10 (6th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956).
91. Cardinal of Adrian, Inc. v. Peerless Wood Prods., Inc., 515 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975);
Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974); Ajem Labs., Inc. v. C. M. Ladd Co., 424 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
830 (1970); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckenthron Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964); Sparton Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699 (6th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962).
92. 515 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975). This decision was also discussed in another context in
the text accompanying notes 78-80 supra. The case involved several patents, one (the '532
patent) which had been altered by amendment and another (the '124 patent) which had
been obtained via a continuation-in-part application. Cardinal of Adrian, 515 F.2d at 537-
39. The prior discussion focused on the court's analysis of the continuation-in-part applica-
tion in issue in the case. The instant discussion focuses on the court's analysis of the validity
of the patent application which had been altered by amendment.
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1974 decision, is the most recent of the Sixth Circuit decisions ap-
plying the Muncie Gear test. In Cardinal of Adrian, the court ex-
plained in detail the "two-pronged test" s which it relied upon to
invalidate the plaintiff-patentee's claims.94 Cardinal of Adrian is
important, however, as an example not only of the continued and
incorrect use of the two-pronged test in the Sixth Circuit when
new matter has been added by amendment, but also of the severity
of judicial misunderstanding of the effect of Section 132 on Muncie
Gear's holding.
In discussing its interpretation of the two-pronged test, the Car-
dinal of Adrian court went so far as to say that "[t]he introduction
of new matter [by amendment] is not itself prohibited where the
rights of the public have not intervened." 5 The fact is, of course,
that the intervening rights of the public has become an irrelevant
consideration when new matter has been added to the disclosure
by amendment. The Cardinal of Adrian court had obviously never
been exposed to the mandate of 35 U.S.C. section 132 and, as a
result, rendered a decision with dicta diametrically opposed to the
express language of the statute.
3. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit also views Muncie Gear as a late disclosure
case, but totally unaware of the existence of section 132, it has con-
sistently, but incorrectly, engaged in the entire two-pronged
Muncie Gear analysis of amendments to patent applications which
were subject to the provisions of the 1952 Act. 6 Price v. Lake
Shore Supply R.M., Inc.,97 is both an illustrative example of the
Tenth Circuit decisions and the latest word spoken by that court
on the issue.
In Price, the defendant in a patent infringement action charged
that "the Muncie Gear ruling was fatal to plaintiff's patent."'" The
93. Id. at 538.
94. Id. at 539.
95. Id. at 538 (emphasis added). Intervening rights as used in this context refers to prior
public sale or use by a party other than the patentee or assignee. See, e.g., Scriber-Shroth
Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938).
96. Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1974); King-
Seely Thermos Co. v. Refrigerated Dispensers, Inc., 354 F.2d 533, 538-39 (10th Cir. 1965);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 308 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952
(1963).
97. 510 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 393.
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court first explained in detail the Muncie Gear test.9" Then exam-
ining Muncie Gear's second prong first, it found that the plaintiff-
patentee had added the suspect claims more than one year after
the public sale of a device embodied in the claims.100 Upon analysis
of the first prong, however, the court found that the claims in issue
did not add "new matter" into the original disclosure of the inven-
tion.10 l The claims were, therefore, held valid.10 2
4. The Court of Claims
The Court of Claims has thrice considered Muncie Gear based
defenses. 03 After a confusing discussion of its interpretation of
Muncie Gear in the first of the three cases,'" this court subse-
quently clarified its adherence to a late disclosure view of the
Muncie Gear doctrine.' 0
The first decision was in Pratt and Whitney Co. v. United
States. 6 The Court in Pratt and Whitney invliadated a broad-
ened claim submitted for the first time in a divisional applica-
tion'07 more than the statutory period after public use or sale. 08 It
must be emphasized, however, that the court in Pratt and
Whitney did not explicitly address whether or not the claims in
issue had added new matter, yet the court did seem to intimate
that new matter was contained in the suspect claim. The Pratt and
Whitney court repeatedly referred to the application in issue as
allegedly having been a divisional application, 0 9 the necessary im-
plication being that the court doubted the accuracy of the paten-
tee's label for the application. Hence, the court may have been
voicing its belief that the application should have been labeled a
continuation-in-part application for having added new matter via
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Rel-Reeves, Inc. v.
United States, 534 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Pratt and Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d
838 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (alternative holding).
104. Pratt and Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 838 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (alternative
holding).
105. Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Rel-Reeves, Inc. v.
United States, 534 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
106. 345 F.2d 838 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
107. For a discussion of the distinction between divisional and other types of applica-
tions, see notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
108. 345 F.2d at 843-44.
109. 345 F.2d at 840, 843.
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the suspect claim. Under this interpretation of the Pratt and
Whitney decision, the court's invalidation of a claim added more
than one year after prior public use or sale would make complete
sense.
Subsequent decisions by the Court of Claims have impliedly
clarified, or at the very least corrected, the Pratt and Whitney de-
cision. The first of the subsequent decisions was Rel-Reeves, Inc. v.
United States in 1976.110 Without any reference to the Pratt and
Whitney decision, the court in Rel-Reeves went through a com-
plete analysis of the claims in issue under a late disclosure type
Muncie Gear test."' Because the claims had not added new matter
to the disclosure of the original application, they were held valid
under Muncie Gear.11 2
In Bendix Corp. v. United States,113 the Court of Claims reiter-
ated its view of the Muncie Gear decision as announced in Rel-
Reeves, again making no reference to the Pratt and Whitney deci-
sion. The court in Bendix found that claims submitted via amend-
ment did not embody new matter and were therefore valid under
Muncie Gear.1 14
Given the uniformity of the interpretations given Muncie Gear
in Rel-Reeves and Bendix and the lack of reference in those deci-
sions to any conflict that might exist between Pratt and Whitney
and Rel-Reeves or Bendix, it is not illogical to presume that Pratt
and Whitney was indeed a poorly written decision that hinged
upon a finding of new matter being added more than one year after
public sale or use. Such an interpretation of Pratt and Whitney
would, of course, put the decision in full conformance with the
holding of Muncie Gear and the scheme embodied in the resissue
statutes. Nevertheless, as the more recent Bendix and Rel-Reeves
decisions make clear, the Court of Claims presently views Muncie
Gear as having created no more than a late disclosure type of
defense.
Though the Court of Claims has correctly interpreted Muncie
Gear, it too has failed to realize the impact of section 132 on the
Muncie Gear analysis. The amendments in issue in Pratt and
Whitney and in Bendix were filed in 1951 and 1944, respectively,
110. 534 F.2d 274 (Ct. C1. 1976).
111. 534 F.2d at 280-81.
112. Id. at 281.
113. 600 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
114. 600 F.2d at 1369-70.
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and were not subject to the statutory ban on new matter enacted
in the Patent Act of 1952. There was thus no reason for the Court
of Claims to consider the effect of section 132 on Muncie Gear in
either decision, but the court in Rel-Reeves dealt with an amend-
ment subject to the 1952 Act. As revealed by the analysis in Rel-
Reeves, the Court of Claims has not been apprised of the section's
existence and its effect on the Muncie Gear two-pronged test.
The Coexistence of the Muncie Gear Test
with Section 132
The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have also cor-
rectly interpreted Muncie Gear as a late disclosure case. Although
these circuits have recognized the existence of section 132, intra-
circuit as well as inter-circuit disagreement exists as to whether the
analysis performed is based upon section 132 or the two-pronged
test of Muncie Gear.
1. The Fourth Circuit
Through two decisions1 5 rendered after the enactment of the
Patent Act in 1952, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has taken a confusing stance. In one case,1 6 the Fourth Circuit
correctly interpreted Muncie Gear as a late disclosure case but
failed to recognize the mandate of section 132 and its effect upon
the two-pronged test of Muncie Gear. In a later decision,"'7 this
circuit recognized the ban of section 132 but made no mention of
the Muncie Gear test.
The first of the two decisions was rendered in 1961 in Chicopee
Mfg. Co. v. Kendall Co." 8 In Chicopee, the defendant alleged that
the plaintiff-patentee had broadened his claims to include new
matter in violation of Muncie Gear. The Fourth Circuit agreed,
stating, "[tihere could hardly be a clearer description of an at-
tempt, condemned in Muncie Gear. . ., to broaden a claim to in-
clude matter not described in the specification which had become
public property through public sale [more than one year prior to
the amendment.]"11 9 Thus, the Chicopee court had needlessly gone
115. Rhone-Poulenc S.A. v. Dann, 507 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1974); Chicopee Mfg. Co. v.
Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961).
116. Chicopee Mfg. Co. v. Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825
(1961).
117. Rhone-Poulenc S.A. v. Dann, 507 F.2d 261 (4th.Cir. 1974).
118. 288 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961).
119. Id. at 724.
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through the two-pronged analysis, having failed to recognize the
existence and effect of section 132.
Thirteen years later, in Rhone-Poulence S.A. v. Dann,120 an
amendment to the plaintiff-patentee's specification was called into
question. The Fourth Circuit upheld the claims in issue because
the amendment did not add "'new matter,' the introduction of
which is precluded by 35 U.S.C.A. section 132."1121 The court in
Rhone-Poulenc, therefore, recognized the total ban on new matter
in section 132 where the amendment at issue was in the specifica-
tions and not in the claims, as was the case in Chicopee and in
Muncie Gear.
Because section 132's ban on new matter distinguishes not be-
tween amendments to the specification and amendments to the
claims, the recognition of section 132 in Rhone-Poulenc logically
also should have occurred in Chicopee, but it did not. As a result,
whether the Fourth Circuit will continue to apply the two-pronged
test of Muncie Gear when claims are amended is not clear; there is
post-1952 Fourth Circuit authority for exclusive reliance on both
section 132 and the Muncie Gear test.
2. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has twice considered the Muncie Gear deci-
sion, adopting the late disclosure interpretation both times. The
first case was Tubular Service & Engineering Co. v. Sun Oil Co.' 8
It concerned amendments to a patent application for which the
1952 Patent Act was not relevant. In conducting its two-pronged
test under Muncie Gear, the court explained that because it found
"no material departure .. .between the monopoly [originally] as-
serted bWfore the Patent Office and that. . . claimed [by amend-
ment]," the court had no reason to analyze the second "prior pub-
lic sale or use" prong of the test.12 4 The claims in issue in Tubular
Service were held valid and infringed.125
Then, in 1973, the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in Penn
120. 507 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1974).
121. Id. at 262.
122. Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir.) (per curiam
adopting district court opinion), af'g 359 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973); Tubular Serv. & Eng'r Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 220 F.2d 27 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
123. 220 F.2d 27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
124. Id. at 31.
125. Id. at 33.
[Vol. 11
Muncie Gear and Section 132
Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc.," 6 adopting per curiam
the district court opinion as its own. Penn Yan Boats involved
amendments directly subject to the terms of the Act. The district
court recognized that, under "the so-called doctrine of 'late claim-
ing' as expressed in Muncie Gear," claims added via amendment
must be adequately supported by the originally filed application,
i.e., they must not contain new matter. 27 The court then contin-
ued by expressing its awareness of the examiner's finding under 35
U.S.C. section 132 that the amendments in issue did not contain
new matter. 28 The court made no further reference to section 132,
failing to recognize how the section had rendered its analysis under
Muncie Gear totally unnecessary.
3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has correctly interpreted Muncie Gear in
the "late disclosure" fashion," 9 yet its decisions present a confus-
ing and contradictory array of approaches toward determining the
validity of an amendment. °30 Although this circuit has used and
continues to use both section 1321'' and the Muncie Gear'32 meth-
126. 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir.) (per curiam adopting district court opinion), af'g 359 F.
Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
127. 359 F. Supp. at 966.
128. Id.
129. Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 679-84 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Continental Can Co., 397 F.2d 517, 522
(7th Cir. 1968); Wen Prods., Inc. v. Portable Electric Tools, Inc., 367 F.2d 764, 767-68 (7th
Cir. 1966); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir.
1960), appeal dismissed, 366 U.S. 211 (1961).
While there is some questionable language in the Faulkner opinion from which one might
argue that the case adopted the late claiming interpretation of Muncie Gear, the court
clearly held that the claims in issue were invalid under Muncie Gear because they had
"wholly failed to disclose mention of the invention asserted under [the] amendments [in
issue.]" Faulkner, 561 F.2d at 680. This fact combined with the three prior holdings of the
Seventh Circuit, which had each adopted the late disclosure interpretation of Muncie Gear,
compel the conclusion that the Seventh Circuit adheres to the literal interpretation of
Muncie Gear espoused herein.
130. Compare, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Continental Can Co., note 124 supra, and Wen
Prods., Inc. v. Portable Electric Tools, Inc., note 124 supra, with Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano
& Organ Co., note 124 supra, and Binks Mfg.-Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., note
124 supra. See also, Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866, 871 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Bendix Corp. v. Balox, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 818 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Coleman Instru-
ments Corp., 385 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1967); Aerosol, Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 334
F.2d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 1964); Helms Prods. Inc. v. Lake Shore Mfg., Inc., 227 F.2d 677, 679
(7th Cir. 1955).
131. Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., note 125 supra; Bendix Corp. v.
Balox, Inc., note 125 supra; Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Coleman Instrument Corp.,
19801
Loyola University Law Journal
ods of analysis, often in the same opinion, ' 33 it consistently passes
up the opportunity to resolve the contradiction of section 132 in-
herent in the two-pronged analysis of Muncie Gear.
Helms Products, Inc. v. Lake Shore Mfg. Co.,134 decided in 1955,
was the first of the Seventh Circuit cases subject to the 1952 Act in
which the validity of an amendment that had allegedly added new
matter was an issue on appeal. The plaintiff-patentee in Helms
Products had amended the specification by adding more detail to
the description of his invention. 1 5 The court held, "35 U.S.C.A.
[section] 132 provides that: '*** No amendment shall introduce
new matter into the disclosure of the invention.'. . . We think the
amendments made in the instant case were [not new matter.]" 136
Five years later, in Binks Manufacturing Co. v. Ransburg
Electro-Coating Corp.,1 -7 the Seventh Circuit failed to recognize
the full impact of section 132 which it had quoted in Helms Prod-
ucts. When the defendant in Binks Manufacturing raised the "late
claiming" defense, the court first held that the claims in issue did
not add new matter in violation of section 132.138 Then, not recog-
nizing the effect of that holding on the two-pronged test of Muncie
Gear, the court stated further, "Muncie Gear. . . is not applica-
ble. In the instant case the original application disclosed the basis
for the amended claims and there is no evidence of public use more
than one year before the invention was first presented to the Pat-
ent Office." 13' The inconsistency of the two holdings is immedi-
ately apparent; the "public use or sale" prong of the amendment
analysis was made irrelevant by section 132.
The confusing use of both section 132 and the Muncie Gear test
in Binks Manufacturing has never been resolved by the Seventh
Circuit. Indeed, subsequent opinions have only enhanced the con-
fusion. Although several Seventh Circuit decisions rendered after
Binks Manufacturing was decided have continued to place exclu-
note 125 supra; Aerosol Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co., note 125 supra; Helms Prods., Inc.
v. Lake Shore Mfg., Inc., note 125 supra.
132. See note 124 supra.
133. Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., note 124 supra; Binks Mfg. Co. v. Rans-
burg Electro-Coating Corp., note 124 supra.
134. 227 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1955).
135. Id. at 679.
136. Id.
137. 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960), appeal dismissed, 366 U.S. 211 (1961).
138. Id. at 257.
139. Id.
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sive reliance on section 132,140 as was done in Helms Products,
others have turned solely to the two-pronged analysis of Muncie
Gear.'4' To complete the confusion and continue the methodology
of Binks Manufacturing, still another Seventh Circuit decision has
again proceeded to analyze an amendment under both section 132
and the two-pronged test of Muncie Gear.142 This continued use of
both methods of analysis should be recognized for what it is-an
incomplete application of a simple federal statute resulting in a
confusing state of Seventh Circuit law.
4. The Ninth Circuit
In 1960, the Ninth Circuit rendered the first 4" of its three deci-
sions that have adhered to the late disclosure interpretation of
Muncie Gear when a defense based on the decision was raised. In
that case, Aetna Steel Products Corp. v. Southwest Products
Co.,144 the court noted that "35 U.S.C. section 132 provides that no
amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention." The court continued:
While this section was enacted in 1952, after the amendment
here involved, that much of the section which excludes new mat-
ter is no more than a codification of the existing law .... As
stated in Muncie Gear... : 'The claims in question are invalid if
there was public use, or sale of the device which they are claimed
to cover, more than two years before the first disclosure thereof to
the Patent Office." 4
Apparently viewing the two-pronged test of Muncie Gear as being
co-extensive with the ban of section 132 (which, of course, it is
not), the court rendered alternative holdings against the validity of
the claims for either adding new matter five years after the filing of
the original application and for being obvious under the prior
140. Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Bendix Corp. v. Balox, Inc. 421 F.2d 809, 818 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Technicon Instr. Corp. v. Coleman Instr. Corp., 385 F.2d 291,
393 (7th Cir. 1967); Aerosol Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 751, 756 (7th Cir.
1964).
141. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Continental Can Co., 397 F.2d 517, 522 (7th Cir. 1968); Wen
Prods. Inc. v. Portable Electric Tools, Inc., 367 F.2d 764, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1966).
142. Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 679 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978) (footnote reference to bar on new matter contained in § 132).
143. Aetna Steel Prods. Corp. v. Southwest Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 323, 333-34 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 945 (1961).
144. 282 F.2d at 138.
145. Id.
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The Aetna Steel decision is typical of the Ninth Circuit's failure
to acknowledge the effect which section 132 has had on the Muncie
Gear two-pronged test. The two Ninth Circuit cases which fol-
lowed, Aetna Steel, Locklin v. Switzer Bros., Inc.147 and Pursche v.
Atlas Scraper and Engineering Co.,"48 relied exclusively on the
Muncie Gear test without mentioning section 132. Thus, the
Muncie Gear test is still followed exclusively in the Ninth Circuit
despite its one-time recognition of section 132.
Exclusive Reliance Upon Section 132
Two appellate courts, the Third Circuit and the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, have turned exclusively to section 132
when the validity of an amendment was put in issue on appeal.
Neither court has, however, addressed the effect of section 132
upon Muncie Gear's two-pronged test.
1. The Third Circuit
In 1972, the Third Circuit decided Hadco Products, Inc. v. Wal-
ter Kidde & Co., 4 ' in which the court made footnote reference to
section 132 when it noted that the patentee's application had been
amended three times. The court acknowledged that "[tihe addition
of new matter to the disclosure by means of an amendment is ex-
pressly prohibited under 35 U.S.C. [section] 132. '1 50 After appar-
ently giving deference to the opinion of the patent examiner who
had found that the amended claims had not added new matter,'5'
the court went on to hold the patent invalid for obviousness.'
Hadco is important for its recognition of the flat ban on the ad-
dition of new matter under section 132, prior public use or sale
regardless. Assuming that the Third Circuit would adopt the late
disclosure interpretation of Muncie Gear, the employment of
Muncie Gear's two-pronged test by a court in the circuit will thus
frustrate not only the plain wording of section 132, but also the
Third Circuit's footnote acknowledgment of the Section in Hadco.
146. Id. at 334.
147. 299 F.2d 160, 167 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962).
148. 300 F.2d 467, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 959 (1963).
149. 462 F.2d 1265, 1267 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1276.
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2. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
As might be expected, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
has repeatedly recognized the existence of section 132 and its ban
on the addition of new matter.'53 It has not yet dealt with Muncie
Gear in connection with an amendment subject to the 1952 Patent
Act, however.
In its only case dealing with Muncie Gear, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals in In re Ruscetta" equated the holding of
Muncie Gear with the statutory bar of section 102(b). Said the
court:
In the Muncie Gear Work case the court predicated its decision
on that part of R. S. 4886 which is now codified in section 102(b)
dealing with events which constitute bars to a patent if they occur
more than a year before the applicant's effective filing date in the
U.S. A filing date, to be effective, must be that of an application
which supports the claims.1"
The court found that the continuing application in question was
not entitled to the filing date of the parent application because it
contained new matter."6
In re Ruscetta is important because it reveals that the Court of
Custom and Patent Appeals does view Muncie Gear as requiring
the invalidation of claims only when they have added new matter
to the disclosure of the invention one year after public sale or use.
Whether this court sees the effect of section 132 on its interpreta-
tion of Muncie Gear is still a question. Presumably, however, this
court, being as familiar as it is with the patent laws, would recog-
nize section 132 for what it does with respect to an analysis of
claims under the test of Muncie Gear.
A NON-STATUTORY LATE CLAIMING DOCTRINE
The Second Circuit is the only federal appellate court that has
adopted the late claiming defense to invalidate claims not contain-
ing new matter when added via amendment." 7 Hence, although it
has had two occasions to consider the ban of section 132 on new
153. In re Winkans, 527 F.2d 637, 639-40 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Heinkle, 342 F.2d 1001,
1007 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
154. 255 F.2d 687, 690-91 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
155. Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
156. Id.
157. See note 7 supra.
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matter, 18 it has had no reason to consider the relationship be-
tween the two-pronged test of Muncie Gear and section 132.
In a series of pre-1952 decisions, the Second Circuit first took an
ambiguous stance on its interpretation of Muncie Gear. Beginning
with Interchemical Corp. v. Sinclair and Carroll Co.159 in 1944,
this court announced that it would hold claims invalid under
Muncie Gear if added by amendment two years after public use or
sale of a device embodied in the claims if they "alter the invention
by introducing claims not previously described as was done in
Muncie Gear." The court in Interchemical held the claims in issue
valid, however, because they had added matter which was substan-
tially equivalent to that which was originally described. 60 Whether
the court felt that a claim not "originally described" was one which
added new matter was not clear.
Then came Engineering Development Laboratories v. Radio
Corporation of America in 1946.16 In a fairly lengthy but some-
what confusing discussion of the law on point, the court in Engi-
neering Development seemed to say that what is critical in invali-
dating claims under Muncie Gear is a finding that they be directed
toward a "new invention" not previously claimed. 162 Since the
claiming of a different or new invention is synonomous with the
claiming of new matter, " the court had seemingly adopted the
late disclosure version of the Muncie Gear test.'"
The Second Circuit reiterated the terminology of Engineering
Development in R. U. V. Engineering Corp. v. Borden Co. in
158. Triax Co. v. Hartman Fabricators, Inc., 479 F.2d 951, 956-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
414 U.S. 113 (1973); Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097, 1106 n.11 (2d Cir.
1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970). See also Burgess Cellulose Co. v. Wood Flong
Corp., 431 F.2d 505, 506 (2d Cir. 1970).
159. 144 F.2d 842, 846 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
160. Id.
161. 153 F.2d 523, 526 (2d Cir. 1946) (L. Hand, J.).
162. The court in Engineering Development made a conscious effort to avoid taking a
clear position on its view of the full extent of the Muncie Gear decision, but it did empha-
size that, in its view, the facts of Muncie Gear had involved the claiming of "new invention"
via the amendment in question in the case. 153 F.2d at 526.
163. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
164. Judge Learned Hand did say that the claiming of a "new invention" does-not in-
volve "only a minor change necessary to secure complete protection for what the applicant
originally intended to secure for himself" nor does it involve "mak[ing] express that which
would have been regarded as an equivalent of the original [or incorporating] into one claim
what was to be gathered from the perusal of all if read together." 153 F.2d at 526. This
negative definition of "new invention" is also in full accord with the positive definition of
"new matter" which the Supreme Court has developed. See notes 45-47 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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1948. 15 This is understandable, since both opinions were written
by the same judge, Learned Hand. The case appeared to leave the
focus on whether the claims in question were directed toward a
"new invention."166
The last in the pre-1952 series of Second Circuit decisions con-
cerning its interpretation of Muncie Gear was also written by
Judge Learned Hand in Harries v. Air King Products Co.'6 7 in
1950. In line with his prior opinions, Judge Hand again stated that
Muncie Gear had involved the claiming of a "new invention."' 6 8 In
contrast with prior decisions, however, he muddied the water on
the issue. The claims in issue in Harries were not directed to a
"new invention," but the court intimated in dicta that an "expan-
sion" of claims might be invalid, even though no new invention
had been claimed, if added two years after prior public use or
sale. 69 Such an interpretation of the Harries dicta would, of
course, result in a non-statutory late claiming defense, but the
court went no further, leaving the issue unresolved in holding the
claims in issue invalid.17 0
In its first post-1952 decision, the Second Circuit failed to clarify
its view of Muncie Gear. In Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi,17 1 the court
of appeals adopted per curiam the district court's opinion, which
had invalidated several broadened claims submitted by amend-
ment more than the statutory period after public sale or use. It
appeared, however, that the patentee had claimed new matter by
changing the entire focus of the claims in issue from the invention
disclosed in the original application.7 2 Nevertheless, since the dis-
trict court's opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the Second
Circuit's interpretation of Muncie Gear was still in flux.
The vacillation of the Second Circuit on the issue was finally re-
solved more than twenty-four years later in Kahn v. Dynamics
165. 170 F.2d 688, 689 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.).
166. Id.
167. 183 F.2d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 1950).
168. Id.
169. As authority for this statement, Judge Hand cited not Muncie Gear but Crown
Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1938). As explained in
note 44 supra, the case held no such thing. The language from Crown Cork & Seal that
evidently misled Judge Hand was, as also explained above, merely an attempt by the Court
to limit its decision to the facts before it and not an announcement of any such rule of law.
170. 183 F.2d at 160.
171. 229 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam adopting district opinion), affg, 120 F.
Supp. 235, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
172. Id.
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Corp. of America7 3 with unfortunate results. In an alternative
holding in Kahn,17 4 the district court had affirmatively espoused
the view that Muncie Gear did create a non-statutory late claiming
defense. 7 5 In considering the defense, the district court explained,
it is immaterial ... whether or not the claims in suit were sup-
ported by the application as originally filed.... The applica-
blility of the defense is not dependent on whether the claims in
issue are based on new matter added to the disclosures subse-
quent to the filing of the application, and is not rendered inappli-
cable because broader claims were present in the application as
originally filed.'17
Thus, because Kahn, the plaintiff-patentee, had added claims
which were directed to more specific subject matter not essentially
the same as that claimed originally, the district court held the
claims invalid.177
The court of appeals in Kahn affirmed the district courts deci-
sion in all respects,7'7 but said very little with regard to the late
claiming defense and its view of Muncie Gear. 79 The opinion sim-
ply states that the claims were invalid because "[tihey were not
presented under either the original or the continuation application
until more than one year after equipment substantially the same as
that charged to infringe had been on sale or delivered to custom-
ers."' 80 The net effect of the Kahn decision was, of course, to give
appeals court authority to the nori-statutory late claiming defense
in the Second Circuit.
As previously noted,' 8' two cases have been decided by the Sec-
ond Circuit in which the validity of an amendment was called into
question on appeal for the alleged addition of new matter. In both
cases, Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co.'8 and Triax Co. v. Hart-
173. Kahn v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 508 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir.) (alternative holding),
aff'g, 367 F. Supp. 67, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930
(1975).
174. The district court in Kahn had also held the claims in issue invalid for anticipation
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 367 F. Supp. at 71-72.
175. Id. at 72-73.
176. Id. at 72.
177. Id.
178. 508 F.2d at 939, 943 (2d Cir.) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930
(1975).
179. 508 F.2d at 943.
180. Id.
181. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
182. 417 F.2d 1097, 1106 n.11 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970).
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man Fabricators, Inc.,83 the court clearly recognized that under 35
U.S.C. section 132 no new matter can be added to an amendment.
In both cases the court found that the amendments in question did
not add new matter to the disclosure of the invention.1 84 No refer-
ence was made in either case to the Muncie Gear two-pronged test.
The lack of recognition of the effect of section 132 on Muncie Gear
is not surprising, however, given the Second Circuit's misunder-
standing of the Muncie Gear holding based upon the addition of
new matter via amendment two years after public use or sale.
CONCLUSION
The disagreement between the federal courts of appeal over the
interpretation of the Muncie Gear doctrine is not surprising. After
thirty-two years of repeated advocating by defense counsel and
others of an interpretation of Muncie Gear that is contrary to its
very language, reasoning, and holding, at least one of the appellate
courts was bound to eventually be persuaded to accept the "late
claiming" view of the decision. As it now stands, however, only the
Second Circuit has accepted the late claiming interpretation-in
direct conflict with the late disclosure interpretation espoused by
the seven other circuits that have addressed the issue, as well as
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals.1 85 Only in the Second Circuit will the form over substance
difference between alterations made via an amendment and those
made through a reissue proceeding continue to unjustifiedly cause
a total loss of rights in claims changed via amendment.
What is truly surprising is the uniform failure of federal appeals
courts to recognize the effect of section 132 on the two-pronged
test of Muncie Gear. This lack of recognition, causing continued
analysis under the entire two-pronged test when the validity of an
amendment is in issue, infuses the needless "prior public use or
sale" issue into the analysis at trial and on appeal. It can also lead
a confused court to an incorrect finding of validity when new mat-
ter has been added to an amendment (in violation of section 132) if
public sale or use has not occurred at least one year prior to the
date of amendment.
The lack of recognition of the effect of section 132 on the doc-
183. 479 F.2d 951, 956-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973).
184. 417 F.2d at 1106; 479 F.2d at 956-57.
185. No cases have been found in the Eighth Circuit involving either the Muncie Gear
doctrine or § 132.
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trine of Muncie Gear is probably due to the fact that the courts
deal with the case only when defense counsel advocate the late
claiming interpretation. Thus, the court examines the defense only
in an attempt to clarify the circuit's interpretation of the case.
Nevertheless, the appellate courts should be aware of the relation-
ship between the Muncie Gear doctrine and section 132. An ex-
press recognition of the relationship will not only reduce the num-
ber of issues dealt with at trial and the possibility of error, but also
finally convince advocates of the late claiming twist that it will not
be accepted within the circuit. When the validity of an amendment
is suspect, the only salient consideration is whether the amend-
ment added new matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. section 132.
